Istanbul as a Military Target

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The Ottomans viewed Istanbul as the ideal capital of their Empire long before its conquest in 1453. However Istanbul both benefitted and suffered from its location on the straits that connected the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Mehmed II’s rebuilding of the city into a thriving metropolis brought the danger that enemies of the Ottomans would consider access to the city as a military strategy. Istanbul’s large population required an elaborate system of supply to feed the city and sea borne trade was vital for the city’s prosperity.¹ This transformed the need for an effective Ottoman naval force from a desirable option to an absolute necessity. The creation and maintenance of effective naval power progressed unevenly from the 1450s with Mehmed II’s creation of a large but not particularly high quality navy. Bayezid II improved the empire’s naval forces through the recruitment of the corsair Kemal Reis as a commander. During the reign of Süleyman, under the former corsair,

Admiral Hayreddin Pasha, Ottoman naval power extended to the western Mediterranean and the shores of Algiers. Hayreddin led the Ottoman navy so effectively that he defeated the combined forces of Venice and Habsburg Spain under the Genoese admiral Andrea Doria at Preveza in 1538. Thus in the period when Ottoman naval power dominated not only the eastern but the western Mediterranean, Istanbul had little to fear from a naval attack on the city or the straits leading to it by any Ottoman enemies.

During the war to conquer Cyprus in the 1570s, one Venetian official proposed attacking the straits leading to Istanbul to divert the Ottomans from their conquest. In the 1570s, this idea was not feasible; since although Ottoman naval leadership lacked an admiral such as Hayreddin the Ottomans possessed a large navy with enough expertise to ensure that the capital was never threatened. However, when the Ottoman naval power diminished, the idea of attacking the straits and thus Istanbul was bound to revive. This article argues that Istanbul due to its size and location was an obvious military target. The straits had possessed great strategic value from ancient times and this increased during the centuries when Istanbul was the Ottoman capital. This article analyzes the late 1640s and 1650s, when during the the conquest of Crete, Venetian naval forces frequently blockaded Istanbul with dire consequences for the city and the empire. After the conquest of Cyprus in 1570, the importance of Ottoman naval forces had been allowed to diminished and admirals in the seventeenth century were rarely appointed for their naval abilities. Thus when the Ottomans began a war against Venice in 1645 with the goal of conquering Crete, they were unable to protect the city from Venetian blockades of the straits, which began in 1646.

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2 Hayreddin's client, Turgud Pasha was killed at Malta in 1565 and his expertise was greatly missed. Neverthless, his client Uluj later Kiliç Ali provided expertise.

By 1648 the blockades had led to severe food shortages within Istanbul and great discontent among the inhabitants who believed that the situation was worsened by the actions of corrupt officials. The unrest led to the deposition of Sultan Ibrahim in 1648 and the eventual murder of the Valide Sultan Kösem in 1651. Beginning in 1654, four major battles were fought between the Venetian and Ottoman fleets in the straits. The third battle in 1656 was the worst Ottoman naval defeat since Lepanto and increased the effectiveness of the blockade. Thus, Ottoman naval power to break the blockade was necessary both to fight the war by allowing the fleet to transport men and supplies to Crete, and for the survival of the inhabitants of Istanbul. This article is organized chronologically and analyzes Venetian actions and Ottoman responses to them.

1645-1648: Initial Venetian Impact on the Capital and the Deposition of Sultan Ibrahim

Venice was unprepared for the initial Ottoman attack on Crete in 1645 and Ottoman forces quickly overran large portions of the island. As the Venetians sought for a strategy to defend Crete from an Ottoman conquest, they quickly came to the conclusion that the best defense would be an offensive attack. Thus by the beginning of Spring 1646, the Venetians began a blockade that aimed both to prevent the Ottoman fleet from emerging from the Dardanelles to resupply their army in Crete and cut food supply to Istanbul by sea, thus causing as much “annoyance” as possible to the Ottomans in general. Venetian forces even landed on Bozcaada (Tenedos) off the Aegean coast near Troy in 1646 in an attempt to tighten the blockade, although they were driven off. This was an attempt

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5 According to Naima, see Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923 (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 248.

to interfere with Ottoman shipping and it was extremely close to Istanbul. It affected the ability to fight the war, but more importantly it had an impact on life in Istanbul.\(^7\)

Details for the blockade can be found in scholarship relying on Venetian sources that explain how this was executed. In February 1648 a sizable Venetian fleet left Crete and headed for the Dardanelles. Although sailing in winter was hazardous in the Mediterranean, and despite being scattered by a storm at sea, in April, the thirty ships and five galleasses established an effective blockade of the Dardanelles. By 11\(^{th}\) June another Venetian commander, Morosini, arrived with enough ships to bring the total to seventeen galleys, five galleasses and forty-five sailing ships of various sizes.\(^8\)

Even before the arrival of Morosini, the Ottoman fleet had tried to escape the blockade with a force of forty galleys and five mahons, but after encountering the Venetian forces, the admiral retreated to wait for an additional thirty galleys, but these lacked crews.\(^9\) Eventually the admiral traveled overland to Chios, gathered ships from the derya bey\(^s\), and sailed to Crete.\(^10\) While this enabled the Ottomans to supply their forces on Crete, it did nothing to help the situation in Istanbul.

This supports my claim, that when the Ottomans possessed a powerful navy Istanbul had no need to fear naval attack, but with a weak navy, attacks on Istanbul or the straits quickly became a reality. Within months of the outbreak of the war, Venice realized this strategy would be the most effective in preventing the Ottoman’s from winning the war. They had a sufficient number of ships, led by competent seafarers, to take the fight to the Ottomans most

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9 Anderson, *Naval Wars*, 134–35. Anderson states that the admiral’s name was Ibrahim, but no Ibrahim was admiral during this period. According to İşın, *Osmanlı Bahriyesi Kronolojisi*, EK-9, the admiral in the first half of 1648 was Himarzade Mehmed Pasha.
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important possession to its capital that had a highly vulnerable location. Despite the upheavals of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Istanbul had increased in population. The empire’s ability to supply the city had become increasingly strained. Moreover, with little need for effective naval leadership after the turn of the 17th century, naval forces of the empire were frequently led by political appointees. According to Katib Çelebi by the 1640s they were paying for their position which he saw as a wide spread problem beyond the navy. Consequently the Venetians had little difficulty in establishing a blockade that inexperienced admirals failed to evade. Beginning in May 1648 for a year the Ottomans could not emerge from the Dardanelles, moving their naval base to Çeşme, but leaving Istanbul suffering from lack of supplies. Katib Çelebi described how the Venetian knowledge of geography had provided their expertise to blockade the Dardanelles and the frustration of the naval leaders and the Ottoman military when they simply could not find a solution to the blockade in May 1648.

This blockade which extended from May 1648 to May 1649, certainly contributed to the deposition of Sultan Ibrahim in August 1648. It was not usual for naval forces to remain in combat positions over the winter, and because the Venetians maintained the blockade this indicates that this was an effective strategy. Although the strength of the Venetian blockade varied during the winter, reinforcements arrived in May 1649. The previous summer, while the city was suffering, the Grand Vizier gave robes of honor to the military leaders. While the leaders could continue to live a life of

ostentation, food supplies were lacking for the general population. The result were unrest, which finally left the Valide Sultan Kösem no other option but to agree to the removal of her mentally unstable son Ibrahim and the enthronement of her grandson Mehmed in his place. The deposition of Ibrahim, brought his young son, Mehmed IV (1648–1687) to the throne. This also led to competition for power between two Valide Sultans: Mehmed’s mother Turhan, and his grandmother, Kösem, who continued to control politics. Factional strife had reached fever pitch and was still increasing. Certainly, the Venetians realized the blockade led to unrest, which aided their war effort. At this point two Valide Sultans competed over who should control the empire given that the sultan was a child of seven years. Despite the factional fighting, Ottoman leaders such as the grand vizier Koca Mehmed Pasha sought for a way to solve the problem of the Venetian Dardanelles blockade and thus summoned corsairs from North Africa.

1649–1651: Increasing Blockades and the Murder of Kösem

With the corsairs’ advice, in May 1649 the Ottoman fleet evaded the Venetian blockade by first establishing batteries on the European side of the straits, which prevented most of the Venetian ships from joining in fighting the Ottoman fleet. However, this strategy only brought a few months of relief to Istanbul, because by March 1650 another Venetian blockade was in place, which was maintained more or less continuously until May 1654. This interrupted Istanbul’s supplies more dramatically than the previous blockade and led to more extensive unrest in the capital. In late 1649 or early 1650, “It had been proposed that the Venetian fleet

17 Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 234.
18 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetül-kıbar, 100a–100b, Gift to the Great Ones, 129–30.
19 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetül-kıbar, 100a–100b, Gift to the Great Ones, 129; Anderson, Naval Wars, 136–37.
20 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetül-kıbar, 100b–101a, Gift to the Great Ones, 130; Dankoff, Intimate Life, 24.
should force the passage and attack” Istanbul or at least the arsenal. However, the Venetians decided that realistically, they could only tighten the blockade.21

Finally, in November 1650, the Ottoman leadership decided that the time had come to take the blockade seriously and decided to appoint an experienced seafarer, Husambeyzade Ali Pasha, the derya bey of Rhodes, as the new admiral.22 Earlier in May of that year, the previous admiral, Haydarağazade Mehmed Pasha, had not attempted to evade the blockade and had sent troops overland to embark on the derya bey ships at Chios.23 Although it might have seemed obvious that an effective naval leader was needed in this situation, for a variety of reasons, the Grand Vizier Melek Ahmed Pasha hesitated to make this appointment. Yet, measures had to be taken according to the historian Naima, “The inhabitants of the city began to complain about the high cost of bread, meat, and other basic provisions, but when they submitted petitions to the authorities, their complaints went unheard.” The problems of supplies were exacerbated by profiteering perpetrated by some government officials.24 The financial corruption in the empire at this time became a major factor in Husambeyzade’s appointment as admiral.

It became increasingly clear to the Ottoman leadership that changes were necessary to remove the blockade. Katib Çelebi illustrates how changes in technology and leadership were attempted at the same time. “An imperial edict was issued on 23 Receb/22 July 1650 for the construction of 23 galleons and bertones. ... 11 Sevval/7 October, 1650 Captain Haydar Agazade was dismissed from his job and his post was given to Ali Pasha, the son of Husam Bey, who was the bey of Rhodes.”25 The derya bey of Rhodes was a naval professional whose experience included commanding a squadron

21 Anderson, Naval Wars, 141.
22 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar, 102a, Gift to the Great Ones, 130.
23 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar, 101b-102a, Gift to the Great Ones, 130; Anderson, Naval Wars, 141.
24 Naima, see Murphey, “Introduction,” 29.
25 Katib Celebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar, 102b, Gift to the Great Ones, 130.
of ships stationed at Rhodes to protecting convoys sailing between Alexandria and Istanbul.  

For the Ottoman elite, the war had priority over the needs of the inhabitants of Istanbul. Since it was vital to take reinforcements to Crete, five thousand soldiers were recruited and on 12 November 1650 Ali Pasha set sail with eighteen galleys. Sailing in winter was dangerous and for this reason the Venetians had relaxed the blockade of the Dardanelles. Ali Pasha emerged with his fleet and was joined with additional ships provided by the derya beys. They arrived at Crete on 2 January 1651 and disembarked the soldiers, after which Ali Pasha returned safely to Istanbul. Katib Çelebi described Ali Pasha's success in taking reinforcements to Crete during the winter time so quickly as unprecedented.  

Katib Çelebi's naval history of the Ottoman Empire does not hint at the factional fighting that surrounded Husambeyzade Ali Pasha's appointment as admiral. Naima, who relished expounding about court intrigue in his chronicle, explained how Husambeyzade's appointment led to a dispute between the Grand Vizier Melek Ahmed Pasha and another vizier, Siyavuş Pasha. While individuals such as the Grand Vizier were profiting from the sale of offices, this led to the appointment of incompetent men to lead the navy. Ottoman naval weakness allowed the Venetians to blockade the straits with their fleet, causing great distress in Istanbul. When Ali Pasha arrived in Istanbul to take up his position as admiral, the original plan was to promote him to viziership. But in order to gain the vizierate an individual needed to pay the sum of 40,000 gurus. Ali Pasha refused the vizierate and requested to be allowed to retain  

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26 Svat Soucek, “Rodos,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed.
28 Naima was not an eyewitness of this period, he relied on other authors, especially Katib Çelebi, but this incident is not included in Katib Çelebi. Although the basic information must have come from a contemporary source, Naima may have used Siyavuş’s response as an opportunity to express his own perspectives on Ottoman government, see Lewis V. Thomas, A Study of Naima (New York: New York University Press, 1972).
29 At this period probably 120 akçe.
his previous post. Nevertheless, he was sent with the troops that had been recruited in late 1650 and he transported them safely to Crete.  

Naima states that Husambeyzade had been made admiral with the rank of pasha, rather than vizier, on condition that he gave the expected amount, but he had not paid anything to become a pasha. This lack of payment appears to have led some individuals to slander him: claiming that he was not being diligent in performing his duties. But Naima recounted how Ali Pasha was diligent in both Istanbul and Chios preparing to meet the threat of the arrival of the Venetian fleet.

Siyavuş Pasha, who recognized Husambeyzade’s merit, refused to accept that he was not receiving an appropriate rank as admiral because he had not paid an acceptable amount of money. He pestered the grand vizier concerning this until Melek Ahmed Pasha sent a messenger informing him that Husambeyzade should be admiral for the good of the state, but it was unnecessary for him to be made a pasha or vizier. Siyavuş Pasha critiqued the influence or patronage that controlled appointments. He referred to the state’s concerns that winter, which principally stemmed from the blockade, and emphasized how necessary it was for a competent naval commander to to solve the problem. He considered Melek Ahmed’s putting his own enrichment before the good of the state as shameful. Siyavuş also gained the support of the powerful senior Valide Sultan Kösem and so Melek Ahmed was forced to accept Husambeyzade’s retaining the position of admiral. When supplies and men were ready in the summer of 1651, Ali Pasha led another

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31 Naima, Târı́b-i, 3: 1285.
32 Naima, Târı́b-i, 3: 1287.
33 Naima, Târı́b-i, 3: 1278, 1279, 1284-1286. Compare Joseph von Hammer, Histoire de l’Empire ottoman, trans. J. J. Hellert, 10: 253. Von Hammer, an Austrian historian of the 18th century wrote a famous history of the Ottoman empire based on Ottoman chronicles. However, he often does not provide specific references in the text of where he had acquired information.
expedition to transport them to Crete sailing without confrontations in the Dardanelles.\textsuperscript{34}

During this summer expedition, the first battle between the naval forces of Venice and those of the Ottoman Empire occurred near Naxos. This indicates that the Ottoman navy despite an intermittent Venetian blockade of the Dardanelles since 1646, the had not engaged in a major battle. Husambeyzade Ali Pasha encountered part of the Venetian fleet on the 8 July 1651 at Santorini and attacked it successfully. Two days later the Venetians attacked the Ottoman fleet while they were obtaining water at the island of Paros near Naxos. According to Naima, the Ottomans were defeated because part of the fleet refused to follow Husambeyzade Ali Pasha’s commands.\textsuperscript{35} Accounts of this battle relying on western sources fail to understand the reasons why the Ottomans were defeated during this battle, although Ottoman authors present different explanations.\textsuperscript{36} The results of the defeat were that the war got prolonged. Melek Ahmed Pasha was replaced as grand vizier due to his financial policies and later that summer Valide Sultan Kösem was murdered in the harem by Turhan Sultan’s supporters. Thus, the Venetian naval policy of considering Istanbul as a military target, led to such disruption of the government that the Ottomans were limited in their success in prosecuting the war.

\textbf{Blockades and Battles of the Dardanelles}

Naval success and failure and its impact on Istanbul were the major concerns during a period when the empire remained in factional chaos. After the naval battles of 1651 ended in defeat that contributed to the murder of Kösem, factional fighting continued as Turhan, the new Valide Sultan, and her supporters searched for

\textsuperscript{34} Katib Celebi, \textit{Tuhfetü’l-ki̇bar}, 103a-b, \textit{Gift to the Great Ones}, 131.
\textsuperscript{36} Compare Katib Çelebi, \textit{Tuhfetü’l-ki̇bar}, 103a-b; \textit{Gift to the Great Ones}, 131; Dankoff, \textit{Intimate Life}, 51, translating Evliya Çelebi.
solutions to the empire’s problems. Turhan’s advisor, the influential chief justice of Anatolia, Hocazade Mesud Efendi, identified three critical issues facing the empire: the condition of the fleet, the war in Crete, and obtaining money to finance the war. However, solving these problems were contradictory terms: trying to put the empire’s finances in order conflicted with financing the war to conquer Crete.\(^37\) However, still the background to these debates was the continuing blockade.

In 1652 Husambeyzade sent eight galleys to evade the Venetian blockade which was in place in May 1652. Katib Çelebi stated that the galleys passed “as if they were a caravan of camels” while the infidels waited on the opposite shore.\(^38\) While this clever maneuver helped the war effort, ships bringing supplies to Istanbul could not benefit from this tactic and conditions in the city did not improve. Ali Pasha attempted to capture the Venetian island of Tinos, no doubt in an attempt to draw the Venetians from the Dardanelles. However, he was unsuccessful and his opponents used this as an excuse to demote him to the bey of Morea and he was replaced as admiral by Çavuşzade Mehmed Pasha.\(^39\) Before Husambeyzade could move to his new position, he was imprisoned and only released when his son paid a ransom.\(^40\) Naval leadership was in chaos and Istanbul continued to suffer.

The blockade and admirals’ successes or failures in evading it dominated the following years. Admiral Çavuşzade Mehmed Pasha sailed from the Dardanelles in 1653 because the Venetians were not enforcing the blockade. However, the next admiral, Admiral Kara Murad Pasha consulted with the most experienced and competent naval advisors available, Ottoman corsairs from North Africa, on how best to run the Venetian blockade in the Dardanelles in 1654.\(^41\) The corsairs from Tunis and Tripoli had extensive experience with
commanding sailing ships in combat. Thus in 1654, the Ottoman fleet with the support of the seafarers of Tunis and Tripoli successfully sailed from Istanbul to the first of four battles of the Dardanelles. On 16 May 1654 as the Ottoman fleet faced the Venetian blockade, Kara Murad Pasha led forty-five galleys, six mahons and twenty-two brigantines, while a supporting fleet of fourteen ships from North Africa and twenty-two galleys from the Archipelago threatened the Venetian retreat. Previously Husambeyzade Ali had broken the chain of Venetian ships in the Dardanelles with a small squadron of three galleys. Husambeyzade landed at Tenedos, where he met the forces previously gathered by the derya beys and those from Egypt. Meanwhile, the main Ottoman fleet, which had the wind as well as the current in its favor, defeated the Venetians in the Dardanelles. Murad stopped to collect the vessels gathered by Husambeyzade Ali and then sailed to Crete. Admiral Kara Murad Pasha returned to the Dardanelles in August and permitted the North African ships to return to their bases. Due to British attacks on Tunis the following year, the Ottoman fleet lacked the participation and advice of the North African corsairs during the next few years.42

Although Kara Murad had possessed no naval experience, he had the wisdom to follow the advice of naval experts, especially those who knew how best to handle sailing ships in combat situations, the corsairs of North Africa. However, after his success as admiral in 1654, he was promoted to Grand Vizier. The result was that next year the admiral Mustafa, who was again inexperienced, and without the aid of the corsairs of North Africa did not perform well. The second battle of the Dardanelles in June 1655 was a decisive Ottoman defeat, when the fleet tried but failed to evade a Venetian blockade.

The situation became even more dire in 1656, which was a year of great unrest. The third battle of the Dardanelles was viewed by contemporaries as the worst naval disaster for the empire since the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, when almost the entire Ottoman fleet and 30,000 men were destroyed. A result of the defeat in the

third battle of the Dardanelles was that the Venetians then occupied Tenedos and Lemnos, whose location at the mouth of the Dardanelles allowed the Venetian blockade to become even more effective. This led to scarcity of food and other necessities in Istanbul and high prices.43

The strong position of the Venetians in the spring of 1657 led to Venetian plans to attack Istanbul itself, but the fourth battle of the Dardanelles, in 1657 was an Ottoman victory and thereafter the Venetians less effectively pursued the strategy of blockading the straits. They lost Tenedos and Lemnos in 1657 and the cost of maintaining the blockade became too expensive for Venice to continue with the large fleets as in the past. However, due to the success of blockades of the straits leading to Istanbul over a period of more than ten years, from 1646 to 1657, the Ottomans had failed to conquer Crete quickly. Venetian attacks on Istanbul, diverted the Ottomans from their military goals and prevented the conquest of Crete until 1669. Although the Ottomans ultimately conquered Crete, the Venetian strategy of blockading the straits would be repeated in the eighteenth and early twentieth centuries by new opponents. Istanbul due to its strategic location and desirability would remain a military target for centuries.

43 Anderson, Naval Wars, 161; Setton, Venice, 182–85; Katib Celebi. Tuhfetü’ll-kibar, 107b–108a; Gift to the Great Ones, 134. Husambeyzade’s participation in these battles is not recorded.